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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In this brief the Appellant presents the following issues
for review:
1.

Does Respondent's failure to summon a named party

prior to trial or entry of judgment against a co-defendant,
compel Respondent to proceed against Appellant by Order to Show
Cause under Rule 71B(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
2.

Does entry of a "judgment by default" have the

same procedural effect as a "trial" as that terra is used in Rule
4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
DETERMINATIVE CASES, STATUTES AND RULES
Interpretation

of

the

following

cases,

rules

of

civil

procedure and official references are determinative of the issues
raised in this brief:
Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Company, 76 P.2d 234 (Utah 1938);
McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, 411 P.2d 129 (Utah
1966);
Watson v. State, 694 P.2d 560 (Oregon 1985);
Section 104-3-17 Revised Statutes of Utah (1933);
Section 104-5-17 Revised Statutes of Utah (1933);
Section 104-31-1 Revised Statutes of Utah (1933);
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
Rule 71B(a) - (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
This is an appeal as of right wherein Appellant seeks

review of a Memorandum Decision entered by the Fifth Circuit
Court of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County, Murray Department.
The Memorandum Decision of the court below was dated and entered
July 21, 1989. [R. 79]
This is a case of first impression before the Court of
Appeals, calling for an interpretation of Rule 7IB of the Utah
Rules

of

Civil

Procedure,

as

pertaining

to

the

procedure

necessary to commence an action against a person jointly indebted
upon an obligation, where such joint obligor was not originally
served with process prior to judgment being taken against a codefendant/co-obligor who had been served with process and duly
defaulted.
The underlying civil action was filed on the 22nd day
of November 1985, by Commercial Security Bank, now known as Key
Bank, naming Martin Parcell and Stephanie Johnson as parties
Defendant. [R. 1-3]

On the 26th day of November 1985, Defendant

Martin Parcell was joined as a party when he was served with a
summons and complaint. [R. 4]

Stephanie Parcell was not summoned

until several years after a judgment by default had been entered
against her former spouse/co-defendant. [R. 13]
The basis of Respondent's claim against Appellant is a
joint credit card obligation allegedly owed by Appellant and her
former husband, Martin Parcell. [R. 79]

On the 13th day of January 1986, Default judgment was
entered
Parcell.

in

favor

[R. 13]

of

Plaintiff

On October

and

against

Defendant Martin

13, 1988, Defendant

Stephanie

Johnson was for the first time served with the Summons and
original Complaint in this matter. [R. 51]
B.

Statement of Facts
1.

Appellant was named as a co-defendant with her

former husband, Martin M. Parcell (hereinafter "Parcell") in a
lawsuit filed against them by Commercial Security Bank on or
about November 20, 1985. [R. 1-3]
2.

Summons was duly served on Parcell, but not on

Appellant. [R. 4]
3.

Judgment

person jointly

was

recovered

against

Parcell,

as

a

indebted upon an obligation, but not against

Appellant. [R. 13]

The judgment against Parcell was taken by

default and duly entered on January 13, 1986. [R. 13]
4.
receive

Appellant was not served, nor did she otherwise

notice

of

the

original

action,

until

she

received

personal service of summons and a copy of the original complaint
on October 13, 1988, nearly three years after judgment had been
entered against Parcell, who had by then left the jurisdiction.
[R. 51]
5.

On April 18, 1989, the court below heard oral

arguments on Appellant's Motion to Dismiss. Memoranda in support
of, and in opposition to, appellant's Motion to Dismiss were
submitted by counsel. [R. 57-67]

6.

On

July

21,

1989,

the

court

below

denied

Appellant's Motion to Dismiss finding in pertinent part that
"Rule

7 IB of the Utah

exclusive

remedy

for

Rules

of Civil Procedure

Plaintiff

to

pursue

is not an

against

Defendant

Johnson, [and that] Plaintiff may elect to proceed either under
Rule 4(b) or 71B of URCP." [R. 79]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

Rules 4(b) and 7 IB of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure are mutually exclusive remedies or procedures in that
Rule 4(b) governs the timing of service of summons prior to trial
and Rule 7IB sets forth the procedure for binding a judgment
against a party not originally served, but jointly obligated on a
debt.
II.

Entry of a "Judgment by Default" has the same

procedural effect as a "Trial" as that term is used in Rule 4(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
summon a co-defendant
against

another

Therefore, if plaintiff fails to

prior to entry of a default

co-defendant,

plaintiff

is

judgment

precluded

from

proceeding under Rule 4(b) and if plaintiff is to proceed against
the defendant not summoned, he must do so under Rule 71B(b).

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
RULES 4(b) AND 71B OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
ARE
MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE
REMEDIES/PROCEDURES AND THE COURT BELOW ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF-BANK MAY ELECT TO
PROCEED AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HEREIN
UNDER EITHER RULE 4(b) OR RULE 7IB.
Both Rule 4(b) and Rule 72B of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provide for bringing a defendant before the Court in
situations

wherein

multiple

defendants

are

involved.

More

specifically, the aforementioned Rules of Civil Procedure set
forth in pertinent part, as follows:
RULE 4(b)
.... The summons must be served within one
year after the filing of the complaint or the
action will be deemed dismissed, provided
that in any action brought against two or
more Defendant's in which personal service
has been obtained upon one of them within a
year the others may be served or appear at
any time before trial.
RULE 71B
(a) .... Where the action is against two or
more defendants and the summons is served on
one or more, but not all of them, the
plaintiff may proceed against the defendants
served in the same manner as if they were the
only defendants.
(b) .... When a judgment has been recovered
against one or more, but not all, of several
persons jointly indebted upon an obligation,
the Plaintiff may require any person not
originally served with the summons to appear
and show cause why he should not be bound by
the judgment in the same manner as though he
had been originally served with process.
(c) . ... Plaintiff

shall issue a summons,

describing the judgment, and requiring the
defendant to appear within the time required
for appearance in response to an original
summons, and show cause why he should not be
bound by such judgment...,
(d) .•.. The pleadings shall consist of
plaintiff's affidavit,
, , a copy of the
original Complaint and Judgment sha 1 1 be
included.
Accordingly, while both of the above cited rules provide a
mechanism for serving process upon a co-defendant and/or haling
h nit

•

are mutual ] y excl 1 isive.

That is, Rule

4(b) is to be utilized to bring a party before the court "at any
time before trial," whereas Rule 71B is to be utilized after a
trial or "[w]hen a judgment has been recover ed against one . . .
but

not

all

<

r

several

obligation . . ."
different

times,

jointly

indebted

upon

an

Thus, the respective rules are to be used at
depending

particular cause of action.
progressed

persons

dictate*

upon

what

has

transpired

in -any

The extent to which a proceeding has

wn *. •:• of

the

rules

is

the

appropriate

mechanism for haling a defendant into court.
the instant case it is clear that plaintiff-Bank has not
<*.les of civil Procedure in its
action

against

plaintiff

to

defendant
properly

Stephanie

proceed

Johnson.

against

Johnson .in this nidi i *i , piaintiit must
to Rule 7IB,

Simply

co-defendant

pi it, for
Stephanie

starve defendant pursuant

This is so for two reasons.

First, pursuant to

Rule 4(b), because the instant action was brought against two
defendants and personal service has been obtained only

; ipoi I one

of them (appellant's former husband), "the other may be served or

appear at any time before trial
default

judgment

has

been

(emphasis added).

entered

against

a

Since a

co-defendant

(appellants husband), this plaintiff is foreclosed from utilizing
Rule 4(b) at this juncture.

This is because a default judgment

has the same procedural effect as a "trial,M as that term is used
in Rule 4(b).

See, argument at Point II, infra.

Thus, if Rule

4(b) is to be used, it must be implemented prior to trial or
judgment.

Second, pursuant to the express provisions of Rule

71B, if a plaintiff wishes to pursue an action against a joint
obligor

in a

situation wherein a judgment

has already been

recovered against a person jointly obligated, he must proceed—if
at all—in accordance with the provisions of Rule 7IB.
A review of the Collateral References to Rule 7IB gives the
correct and consistent interpretation of Rule 7IB.

Section 270

of 59 Am Jur 2d, Parties, as cited under Rule 71B, states the
following:
When, however, the Plaintiff neglects to join
a necessary or indispensable party Defendant
or all those who are liable upon the cause of
action sued upon, particularly where that
liability is joint, the Defendant sued has a
valid ground for objection for which he or
she should be permitted to obtain relief.
This objection is very generally regarded as
of dilatory nature to be presented promptly
and in the method prescribed by local
practice.
59 Am Jur 2d, Section 270, page
804.
This reference clearly shows that the entire purpose of Rule
7IB is to compel plaintiff to proceed in a manner which permits
the defendant to promptly in a non-dilatory manner come before
the court and show why the defendant was an indispensable or

necessa

i •• :on o n t h e joint o b l i g a t i o n a n d should

have been joined prior • > t h e time judgment w a s taken against t h e
other

defendant.

.-- language

of Rul e

71 B

does

not a l l o w

• -^ r?>* t .o proceed i inder either Rule 7IB
- governs
requiring

Summons

* - Appear

t h e form

a n d Show

r: I g i n a ]
reference -

of the pleadings,
Cause,

Affidavit

C o; ' •; •*

*/ h e r e a s

1: h e

. .> i^ m e r e l y to show thar_ plaintiff c a n

serv- a Summons ar i A f f i d a v i t u p o n a c o - d e f e n d a n t
prio~

-^ .

proceed at

of

•

*

h., t

*

any - Lme
: *

"•

"J

it must proceed in compliance with Rule 7IB.

It is noteworthy that the substance of 7IB has been a part
of Utah law for a very protracted period of time.

As earl} as

1933 the substance of Rule 7] R was a part. ->: the Revised Statutes
of Utah.

Section 104-31 ] of the 1933 Revised Statute of Utah

set forth as follows:
104-31-1. J oint Debtors Not Served to Show
Cause Why They Should Not Be Bound by
Judgment.
When a judgment is recovered against one or
more of several persons jointly indebted upon
an obligation, by a proceeding as provided in
section • 104-5-17, those who were not
originally served with the summons and did
not appear in the action may be summoned to
show cause why they should not be bound by
the judgment in the same manner as if they
had been originally served with the summons.
(C.L. 17, Sect- 6874.)
"T h i i s r ci) ii e :i s c omp e 11 e d t o a s k 11: I e qu e s 11 o n, '
" rth y wa s S e c t i o n
104-31-1 enacted as l a w a n d r e t a i n e d a s a rule of civil p r o c e d u r e
(Rule 71B) if a party plaintiff could accomplish the same result

under Rule
Revised
plaintiff

4(b)?M

Statutes

Again, the purpose of Section 104-31-1,
of

Utah,

1933

to proceed against

and

Rule

71B

a defendant/joint

is to compel
obligor

in a

manner allowing such defendant to promptly and in a non-dilatory
manner show cause why she should not be bound by the judgment
rendered against the co-obligor (plaintiff's husband).

Because

plaintiff did not proceed pursuant to Rule 7IB in a non-dilatory
fashion,

reversible

error

was

committed

and

the

Memorandum

Decision issued by the Court below should be reversed.
The only Utah case

appellants are aware of concerning Rule

71B and/or Section 104-31-1, Revised Statutes of Utah (1933) is
Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Company, 76 P.2d 234 (Utah 1938).
Hoyt clearly supports appellants position that, in the instant
case, plaintiff must proceed against appellants—if at all—in
accordance with Rule 7IB.

The Supreme Court of Utah set forth

the following:
In this case it is true that had there been
no security Hoyt could have obtained judgment
against the Lemons, the endorsers, without
summoning the makers or could have later
pursued the makers.
This results from
fitting together sections 104-5-17, 104-31-1,
104-3-17, R.S. 1933.
76 P.2d at 239.
Thus, the clear implication from the aforementioned language
is that if plaintiff desires to pursue a co-defendant who was not
an indespensable party, the appropriate procedure would be the
utilization

of

Sections

104-31-1, and

104-5-17, R.S. 1933.

Similarly, in the instant action, if plaintiff Bank wishes to

action against appellant herein, it must do so in

pursue

!h Rule /IB ot the Utah Rules ut Civil Procedure

compl la

POINT TWO
ENTRY OF A "JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT" HAS THE SAME
PROCEDURAL EFFECT AS A "TRIAL" AS THAT TERM
IS USED IN RULE 4(b), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, AND THEREFORE PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE
TO SERVE DEFENDANT PRIOR TO ENTRY OF THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT PRECLUDES PLAINTIFF FROM
PROCEEDING UNDER RULE 4(b).
As set forth, i n Point One hereinabove

.-

.-=:;*•:• -o

hale a co-defendant into Court pursuant to Rule 4(b), he must
serve pi ocess upon said co-defendant prior tu vi±a
appellant
default

(co-defendant)
judgment

--1 <
this

.;

that

being
j

herein was
entered,
'•"•-^.n:-

not

served

plaintiff
*

iefault judgment

Inasmuch as
pi: io i : t .< > t .he

must

ile 71B.

necessarily

The reason for

tantamount to a

judgment

entered after trial.
17

Ameri can

J i irispr udence

2nd!

Judgments , Sect I on

1193

supports the position that a judgment by default is tantamount
to, and has the same effect as a judgment rendered after a trial
on theraei*its .
The circumstance that the defendant let the
matter go uncontested to judgment does not
impair the effect of a judgment by default,
which is ordinarily accorded similar effect,
and is as much a verity, as a judgment
rendered in a contested proceeding. Although
it has been declared that such a judgment may
be regarded as a conditional judgment,
especially where a rule of court for opening
or striking off the same, the general rule is
that even where a party has the right to have
a judgment by default set aside, such
judgment must, until set aside, be regarded
as a subsisting and regular judgment.

Further, see McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, 411
P.2d 129 (Utah 1966) wherein the Utah Supreme Court iterated the
following:
The purpose of a default judgment is to
conclude litigation when defendant fails to
plead or otherwise defend an action.
411 P.2d at 130.
See also Watson v. State, 694 P.2d 560 (Oregon 1985)
wherein it was set forth as follows:
Judgments entered after default . . . have
the same solemn character as judgments
entered after trial.
694 P.2d at 562.
Accordingly, a default judgment has the same purpose and
effect as does a trial on the merits—to wit—to conclude the
litigation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated hereinabove, the Memorandum Decision
of

the

court

below

should

be

reversed

and

remanded

with

instructions that plaintiff must proceed against Appellant in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 7IB if it is to proceed at
all.
DATED this 16th day of January, 1990.

MOORE, MCDONOUGH & NORTON

ROBERT G.&ORTON
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ADDENDUM
Excerpts from the Record
as cited in Appellant's Brief

BRYAN W. CANNON
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH

Attorneys for Plaintiff
306 Prowswood Plaza
4885 South 900 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone
(801) 263-3344

V?s

Kr/

22

p,..,

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF TTT'fiHr
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
*

* * * * * *

COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,
A Banking

Corporation,

COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,
vs.

MARTIN M. PARCELL and
STEPHANIE H. PARCELL,

Civil No.

Defendants.
t

Plaintiff

*

h

complains

(

[

of

*

*

Defendants

and

for cause

of

action alleges as follows:
1.

The damages claimed in this action are less than

$10,000,»HJ r exclusive of costs.
2.

Plaintiff is a banking corporation authorized to do

business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendants are residents of Salt Lake County, State

3.

Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a

to

uliii 1

of Utah.

puisudnt

! lie Plaintiff

agreed

tn

extend

-ontract
credit

to

Defendants on an open account through the use of a Commercial

15

Security Bank Master Charge Account under Account No. 5413-75435020 -* •
A

Defendants

charged by Defendants

agreed

to

pay

Plaintiff

al ] amount s

on said Master Charge Account,

with itjtPr^Fi it ih<- J i\tv

ni i wont y -one percent

together

(21%) per annum

until paid.
5

Plaintiff

has* fulfilled

al 1

of

i ts

obligations

pursuant tc sa :i d contract bi it Defendants have defaulted on said
contract in that they have failed and refused and to continue to
fail and refuse to pay the amounts due and owing by them.
• '•' ' • -dants tiie Plaintiff has been damaged

in the

LUES

^i

03,560.46, together with

interest at the rate of twenty-one percent

(21%) per annum from

and after September 6, 1983.
7

Pursuant

to

said contract

the Defendants

agreed

that in the event of collection by legal process said Defendants
would pay costs and reasonable attorney's fees jncurjod by the
Plaintiff.

As a result thereof, Plaintiff is entitled to such

reasonable attorney's fees as this Court deems proper.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays Judgment agaii is .t Defendants
as follows:
1.
severally,

in

For

Judgment

the

thereon accruing

at

sum

of

against

Defendants,

$3,560.46,

together

jointly
with

the rate of twenty-one percent

and

interest
(21%) per

annum from the 6th day' of September, 1983, and for a reasonable
attorney's fee as determined by the Court.

-2-

laintiff's costs incurred hereii 1.
—

u

other

and further

relief

as the Court

deems just and proper in t h e premises
DATED til i s

del) o 1' Mi >vo.ml><:.' r , 1 H H 5 .

•6/U'/L^^-

BRYAN W. CANNON
PQOljk, CANNON & SMITH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address:
P. 0. Box 27445
Salt Lake City, Utah

BRYAN W. CANNON
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH

Attorneys for Plaintiff
306 Prowswood Plaza
4885 South 900 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone (801) 263-3344 ,

-4 p?:]

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COUNT
SALT L A K i S S ^ T Y ,

STATU OK UTAH

MURRAY DEPARTMENT

COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,
A Banking Corporation,
P l a i 11 t i f f

SUMMONS

#

vs.

Civil No.

JJARTTN M, PARCEL!/ and
STEPHANIE H. PARCELL,

^SiCMLzSOCei

Defendants,
*

*

*

' I:

I •

i •

•*

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT MARTIN M. PARCELL:
You are hereby summoned and r e g U i r e d to file an answer
in writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the above
entitled Court, and to serve upon, or mail to BRYAN W. CANNON,
Plaintiff's attorney, 306 Prowswood Plaza, 4885 South 900 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, a copy of said answer within 20 days
after the service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has
been filed with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is
hereto annexed and herewith served upon you.

W&*f November

^ATE «2a

985,

7gl? 1-2CQC.O
RflAY PRECIS! COUNTY, UTAH

7

^//jT/^h?

• . DEPUTY.

S e r v e D/6f^nda#t A t :
Vbc
854 E a s t M a r i o n V i l l a g e Road
S a n d y , Utah
OR POB: Colletts Home Furnishings
75 East 7200 South
Midvale, Utah

A

W. CAN!
VObyk, CANNON & SMITH
A*£fe6rneys for Plaintiff

I.

7,0"

1^. KtlJt..

At-t-orfioyti

toi

Pluit^iii

4885 S o u t h 900 E a s t , S u i t e 30o

J

y

S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 2£3-3344

°t£,*K

X?&

Circuit Court, State of Utah
SALT LAKECOUN

vtURRAY DEPARTMENT
)
)
)

COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,
a Banking Corporation,
Plaintiff

DEFAULT

¥S.

MARTIN M. PARCELL and
STEPHANIE H. PARCELL,

\ND DEFAULT
JI JDGMENT
Civil No,,
Defendant(s)

DEFAULT
In this action, defendant(s)
MARTIN M. PARCELL
having been
regularly served with summons and complaint, and having failed to appear and answer plaintiff's complaint,
and the time allowed by law for answering having expired, the default of said defendants) is hereby entered according to law
Dated

J-&*'

/ -> '

Clerk oft tie Circuit.

&U

Deputy Clerk--

" ^ ^

DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Thedcfendant(s)
MARTIN M. PARCELL
or otherwise defend in this action and default has been entered.
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK
judgment against said dcfendant(s) in the amount of:

%

s
%
$

3,560.46

Principal,

1,742.50

Accrued interest to date of judgment.

36.25
700.00
6,039.21

Tias-failed to plead
be awarded

Accrued costs to date of judgment,
Attorney's fees, and
TOTAL JUDGMENT,

with interest on the total judgment at]_2 % per annum as provided by law from thedate of this judgment until
paid, plus after-accruing costs.

jt-crc^ntrMy-* f o r Plaintiff
40 E a s t South Temple, #3 00

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100gg \Vj\0i\y^^

:

08

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE. COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,
a Banking Corporation,
Plaintiff,

SUMMONS
Civil No. 85-CVM-8061

vs.
MARTIN M. PARCELL and
STEPHANIE H. JOHNSON fka
STEPHANIE H. PARCELL,
Defendants.
THE STATE
JOHNSON:

OF UTAH

TO THE ABOVE-NAMED

DEFENDANT

STEPHANIE H.

You are hereby summoned and required to file an
writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of
entitled Court, and to serve upon, or mail to Bryan
Plaintifffs attorney, at 40 East South Temple, #310,
City, Utah 84111, a copy of said answer within twenty
after the service of this Summons upon you.

answer in
the above
W. Cannon
Salt Lake
(20) days

If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has
been filed with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is
hereto annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this

^ ^

day of October, 1988.

.s?

-SZ
J/^'C/lc,
-y7C'*u4,{l'
*~Lac*t^
BRYAN W. CANNON
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Serve Defendant At:
1837 North 300 West
Mapleton, Utah

20

FILED

BRYAN W . CANNON
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH

Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f s
40 E a s t South Temple, ^ 0 JAN 23 A7 5 0
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 538-2100
CIRCDITGsetJRT, STATE OF UTAH
UNTY, SALT LAKE-:-DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUOT

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO
DISMISS

COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,
a Banking Corporation,
P ] a i nt i f ff.(

vs,
Civil No. 85-CVM-8061
MARTIN M. PARCELL and
STEPHANIE H. JOHNSON fka
STEPHANIE H. PARCELL,
Defendants,

I I'M
Key Bank,
hereby

the Plaintiff, Commercial Security Bank nka

by and through its attorney, Bryan w

submit

the following Memorandum

Motion of Dismissa

Cannon,

JH Opposition

-:ifi«i

to the

Defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The above entitled action was filed on the 22nd
Day

i•

S'I bj Commercial Security Bank now known as

Key Bank vs. Martin M. Parcel end Stephanie H. Parcel!.
2.
Martin

Par

Stephanie J

u:, • :•

;oUi aa1.

- .-ed WTI.I

:.IK-

• -•:.-•*

.•

Summons

and

Defendant
Complaint.

Parcel: * ;: :;• • served because Plaintiff did not

know of her whereabouts.
1
21

3.
was

on «.. » ~

entered in

Mro

£

-

r

«* °

of

Defenaant,

Martm

» • * «

-11'

n . Par cell

has never been dismissed ' " »

4 •

«,. said legal action.
Tn October of 1988,
ie H
hereabouts o. l»t«nd.n> Stephan
carried name, Stephanie

^

^

Parcell, ana
^
^
oefendant

•

of

served with the summons and Co.pla.nt

was

ootober,

th. -

1988 •
• * . « permitted to pursue Judgment on a
Plaintiff permx
^
• =<- i person not originally
^ ^ ^
^
jo int obligation agains. . .
other
summons «hen
Judgment has
Is

the

joint o

, TO QOISIIOfi
^

m

J

I

1

1

£

-

m

S

S

m

^ ^ T Z s

W

of the Utah

x
. a-n^/
ai -Rule 71BIDJ ^
,,i
/4W6)
and
(
/
)
W 4,
)
^
^ ^ ^ expressly
Eu les 12(b)
Procedure do no-c r«
oerson not originally served
.
permit the requiring
should
• 4- • appear and show cause wny
Simons and Complaint
P*
. o u q h they
the Judgment in ^
sa
^
^
^
^
^
n o t b e bound W
• • , n v rprvftd with process,
have been originally -.- indebted upon the
* artainst a person jointly
h a s b een recovered against

obligation.

6S

ARGUMENT
Defendant,

Stephanie

»*

Johnsoi

K-t

Stephanie

Parcell (Johnson) -

H,

However,

the Motion was not accompanied by

Memorandum

Authorities to support the Motion

Points and

A mere reference is made to

Rule 12B and Rul<

Procedure.

Nothing in those rules supports Johnson's position,

Defendants

merely

st-nt r that

these provision

Procedure justify dismissing 1 In
grounds

that

Plaintiff,

uf tiie Utah R u l e s

of C i v i l

Uinum* M; . ar i i^onif lau'.1

having

taken

a

Judgment

" n the
against

Defendant r M a r ti n Parcel] , on an alleged joint o b l i g a t i o n
to

joining

proceed

in

Procedure "

Defendant,
accordance
llnwover

Stephanie
with

Rule

H

lolmMm,
7 IB

Utah

prior

i,, reqin rod
Rules

of

to

Civil

Yin I r\ 70 (b) reads as follows:

"When a Judgment has been recovered against
one or more, but not all, of several persons
jointly indebted upon an obligation, the
plaintiff
may
require
any person
not
originally served with the Summons to appear
and show cause why he should not be bound by
the Judgment in the same manner as though he
had been originally served with the process•"
In this case the case was originally styled, Commercial
Security Bank vs. Martin M and Stephanie H. Parcell.

Stephanie

was i ic » t ] ater j oined in the action but was a party from the
outset.

Under the above stated rule, the Plaintiff it, entitled

to require Johnson to appear and show cause why she should not be
bound by a Judg inei it as i thoi lgh she h a d been originally s e r v e d w i t h

5°!
23

process prior to the u -r'arcell,

rn Judgment was 1 a ken against Martin

There is nothing in Rule 12B or Rule 7IB which supports

the position of Defendant, Johnson.
a Judgment against Mart; in Pat coll

The Plaintiff, having taken
if. ullnwiil t.n proceed on the

uncoJ lectenl judgment against the joint obligor, Johnson.
RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED

this

7t&

.._Zc^_.

da

Y

of

•lanuajy

1989.

^l / /// (ft
BRYAN/W. CANNON
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I
and corrt •
this

//

. hereby declare that 1 caur,o<l in h
oi 1 In• foregoing Memorandum,

i W'u .1 true
postage prepaid

day of January, 1989 to the following:

Robert G. Norton, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant, Johnson
275 East 2nd South, #150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

XJ2

&
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ROBERT G. NORTON (USB #51 i#) :
Attorney for Defendant
275 East 2nd South, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 359-8400
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,
a Banking Corporation,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
IN REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO DISMISS.

Plaintiff,
v.
MARTIN M. PARCELL and
STEPHANIE H. JOHNSON, fka
STEPHANIE H. PARCELL,

Civil No. 85-CVM-8061

Defendants.
DEFENDANT

Stephanie

H.

Johnson,

Parcell, submits the following memorandum

fka

Stephanie

H.

in support of her

motion to dismiss and in reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in
opposition to Motion to dismiss:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The above entitled action was filed on the 22nd

day of November 1985, by Commercial Security Bank now known as
Key Bank, naming Martin Parcell and Stephanie Johnson as parties
of Defendant.
2.

On the 26th day of November 1985, Defendant Martin

Parcell was joined as a party when he was served with a summons
and complaint.

Stephanie Parcell was not joined as a party

because she was not served with process and not properly brought
before this court.
PAGE 1
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3.

The basis of Plaintiff's

claims against these

Defendant's is a joint credit card obligation.
4.

On the 13th day of January 1986, Default judgment

was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Martin
Parcell.
5.
was

On October 13, 1988, Defendant Stephanie Johnson

served with the Summons and original Complaint in this

matter.

QUESTION PRESENTED
Contrary to the statement in Plaintiff's Memorandum,
the question presented is: Has the Plaintiff properly complied
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in proceeding on it's
claim against joint obligor Stephanie Johnson when she was not
originally joined as a party until after a judgment was obtained
against joint obligator Martin Parcell?

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION
Rule 7IB of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in part,
reads as follows:
(b) .••• When a judgment has been recovered
against one or more, but not all, of several
persons jointly indebted upon an obligation,
the Plaintiff may require any person not
originally served with the summons to appear
and show cause why he should not be bound by
the judgment in the same manner as though had
been originally served with process
(c) ..•• Plaintiff shall issue a summons,
describing the judgmentf and requiring the
defendant to appear within the time required

for appearance in response to an original
summons, and show cause why he should not be
bound by such judgment... •
(d) .... The pleadings shall consist of
plaintiff's affidavit, .... a copy of the
original Complaint and Judgment shall be
included.

There are no Utah

cases interpreting

there is no comparable Federal Rule.

this Rule

and

The Compilers Notes, Cross

References and Collateral References found under Rule 7IB, refer
the reader to Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
several

sections

contained in Am Jur 2d and to Corpus

Secundum (CJS) under the heading Parties.

Juris

A thorough review of

these references brings to light the purpose of Rule 71B and it's
applicability in this situation.
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
in pertinent part:
.... provided that in any action brought
against two or more Defendant's in which
personal service has been obtained upon one
of them within a year the others may be
served or appear at any time before trial.
At first impression, this Rule would appear to allow
Plaintiff to proceed against Stephanie Johnson in the manner in
which it has, i.e., by simply serving her the original Summons
and

Complaint.

illogical

because

However, upon further
it

renders

Rule

examination

this

7 IB meaningless.

seems
One

is

compelled to ask the question "Why was 7IB drafted when a party
Plaintiff could do the same thing under Rule 4(b)?"

PAGE 3 - REPLY MEMORANDUM
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An answer that immediately comes to mind is that the
permissive language of 7IB allows a party plaintiff to proceed
under summons and complaint under Rule 4(b), or by the more
expedient Order to Show Cause under Rule 71B, requiring defendant
to show cause whey he or she should not be bound by the former
judgment entered.
Again, upon more thorough examination of the history of
this rule, this explanation

becomes illogical because it would

be inconsistent with the principles of res judicata, it does not
explain

why

Rule

71B

specifically

is

limited

to

joint

obligations, and the provisions allowing a full trial on the
merits again renders Rule 71B redundant as to Rule 4(b).
However, a review of the Collateral References gives
the correct and consistent interpretation of Rule 7IB.

Section

270 of 59 Am Jur 2nd, Parties, as cited under Rule 71B, states
the following:
When, however, the Plaintiff neglects to join
a necessary or indispensable party Defendant
or all those who are liable upon the cause of
action sued upon particularly where that
liability is joint, the Defendant sued has a
valid ground for objection for which he or
she should be permitted to obtain relief.
This objection is very generally regarded as
of dilatory nature to be presented promptly
and in the method prescribed by local
practice. 59 Am Jur 2d, Section 270, page
804.
This reference clearly shows that the entire purpose of
Rule 71B is to compel Plaintiff to proceed in a manner which
permits the Defendant to promptly in a non-dilatory manner come

//A

before the

court

and

show

cause why

the

Defendant

was

an

indispensable or necessary party to the action on the joint
obligation and should have been joined prior to the time judgment
was taken against the other Defendant.

The permissive language

of Rule 7 IB is not interpreted to allow Plaintiff a choice as to
whether to proceed under either Rule 71B or Rule 4(b), Rule 71B
governs the form of the pleadings, requiring a Summons to Appear
and Show Cause, Affidavit of Plaintiff and copy of original
Complaint; whereas the reference to 4(b) is made merely to show
that Plaintiff can serve a Summons and Affidavit in compliance
with Rule 7IB at any time prior to trial-

In short, in this case

if Plaintiff is to proceed at all, it must proceed in compliance
with rule 7IB.

CONCLUSION
In the instant case Plaintiff clearly has not complied
with Rule

71B

(c), (d), in

that

Plaintiff

has

not

served

Defendant with a Summons to Appear and Show Cause, Affidavit of
Plaintiff

and

copy

of

original

Complaint.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff's service of process is insufficient and Plaintiff has
failed to state a cause of action against Defendant upon which
relief may be granted, and pursuant to Rules 12B(4) and 12B(6) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the matter should be dismissed.
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DATED this )T
day of February, 1989.

i#U*

ROBERT G. MORTON
Attorney ror Defendant

PAGE 6 - REPLY MEMORANDUM

uv

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a copy of the
JJ

foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM to the following, this

JO " day of

February, 1989.

Bryan W. Cannon, Esq.
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
40 East South Temple, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

fTfefe-
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT

COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,
a Banking Corporation,
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 853008061
MARTIN M. PARCELL and
STEPHANIE H. JOHNSON, fka
STEPHANIE H. PARCELL,
Defendants.

Defendant Stephanie M. Johnson's Motion to Dismiss is denied.
The Court finds that Rule 71B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
is not an exclusive remedy for Plaintiff to pursue against Defendant Johnson.
Rule 71B(a) states that "

the Plaintiff may

" proceed

as provided in the rule. The wording is not mandatory. Plaintiff may elect
to proceed either under Rule 4(b) or 71B of URCP.
DATED this 21st day of July 1989.

-fl

